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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the main contributions of Ronald H. Coase was to demonstrate how mainstream 
economics was based on a contradictory amalgam of costly physical inputs and free 
institutional resources, and to gave origin the economics of institutions: each institution is a 
mode of allocation and organization of economic resources that is to be investigated. In 
particular, none of the institutions (including the market) is a free lunch. The Coasian 
approach regards institutions as costly substitutes and provides a fundamental starting point 
for comparative institutional analysis. However, Coase neglected two issues deriving from 
the observation that institutions are not cost-free. First, when institutions are costly, one 
should not only consider their possible substitutes but also how complementary institutions 
affect their costs, as well as the costs of the possible institutional substitutes. Secondly, the 
economic analysis should also take into account that the transition from one institutional 
setup to another cannot occur in costless meta-institutions. The initial conditions may 
substantially affect the final institutional arrangements. Both the novelty of Coase’s 
approach and its limits were grossly undervalued. The costly institutions assumption 
requires a view of economics as a historical discipline. 
  
 
Keywords: Ronald Coase, transaction costs, institutions, institutional complementarities. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 	

	
$%

	



	



	
$%



		
!




&&
	
"
&(('# 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The classic, or better the standard, neo-classical economic problem has been how to allocate economic 
resources in such a way as to maximize welfare. In the simplest economy represented by the Edgeworth 
box, economic agents, bartering for their goods, achieve some point on the Pareto set (i.e. the contract curve). 
That is, by means of individual exchanges the market takes care of the efficient allocation process – this is 
an expression of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. The conditions on which this 
Theorem is based are that economic resources are costly, while the institutional allocation process –  
namely the market, which can achieve efficiency – is cost-free. Economic resources are costly because they 
are scarce: that is, their complete and universal consumption is not possible. On the other hand, the 
Theorem applies merely to a world where market clearing is free.  In this respect, the standard neo-classical 
approach consists of a contradictory amalgam of costly physical inputs and free institutions, i.e. (good) 
institutions are without cost in a world in which resources are costly. The main contribution of Ronald 
Coase was to investigate how costly resources are allocated within likewise costly institutional 
arrangements.  
The purpose of this article is to explore Coase’s novelty and, in doing so, provide additional insights into 
the central theme of his contributions to economic analysis. We will argue that removing the assumption of 
null transaction costs entails not only that institutions (within which costly goods are substituted) are 
costly, but also that the Coasian substitution among different institutions has to be grounded on positive 
costs due to institutional transition. Moreover, the condition of costly institutions leads to a second result, 
one rather neglected by the Coasian approach: all costly inputs (including institutions) are characterized not 
only by substitution but also by complementarity relations. Both issues require a historical/evolutionary 
approach to the analysis of economic systems.   
According to Robbins’ definition of economics as the science of choices, economists study how consumers 
choose to purchase goods and services and how producers decide on what production factors to employ 
and which quantities of products to make and supply. These choices are expressed through a rate of 
substitution, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution on the consumption side and the marginal rate of 
substitution on the production side. Besides the choice among physical resources, Ronald Coase introduced 
into the economic investigation the choice among institutions (or institutional resources): “economic policy 
involves a choice among alternative social institutions” (Coase 1988a: 28, italics is added). This choice is 
based on the fact that every institution, as well as every physical resource, is costly.  
Accordingly, the market is not “an automatic self-regulating system” (see Coase 1937, 1972, 1988) or locus 
naturalis (Irti 1994); rather, it has costs of functioning or costs for performing a certain transaction. These 
have come to be known in the economic literature as transaction costs. Such costs are 
necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal 
and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to 
undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so 
on (Coase 1960: 15). 
And again, they are “costs of discovering what the relevant prices are; [...] costs of negotiating and 
completing a separate contract for each market transaction” (Coase 1972: 63). 
The concept of transaction costs was introduced in Coase’s article of 1937 (in terms of “the cost of using 
the price mechanism”, “the cost of carrying out a transaction by means of an exchange on the open 
market”), and it was developed in his article of 1960 with the phrase “the costs of market transactions”. 
However, in the literature these two articles, for which Coase was awarded the Nobel Prize by the Royal 
Swedish Academy, have rarely been linked together in a single powerful theoretical framework, and they 
have sometimes even been seen as contradictory – a socialist vs. a liberal Coase.1 Yet Coase’s two main 
articles represent two pieces of the same analysis (see Calabresi 1991, Pagano 2012) aimed at developing 
the concept of transaction costs in order “to understand the working of the economic system, to analyse 
many of its problems in a useful way, or to have a basis for determining policy” (Coase 1988a: 6). Because 
of the existence of transaction costs, economic analysis has to rely on careful study of the actual 
functioning of different institutions and on meticulous comparative institutional analysis. Unfortunately, 
this point of view, in the words of Coase (1988a: 1), “has not in general commanded assent”, nor has it 
“for most part, been understood”.  
The aim of this work is to stress the novelty of the Coasian approach and, at the same time, to analyse its 
two main limitations. First, whilst in the Coasian approach institutions are investigated as 
alternative/substitute instruments for achieving efficiency, we will argue that if all institutions are costly, 
then a significant degree of complementarity may arise among them. Second, the existence of institutional 
complementarity involves the evolution (not necessarily converging) of economic systems, and it is at odds 
with approaches (including Coase’s), in which the market is also contradictorily represented as an a-
historical meta-institution.    
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we summarize the novelty of Coase’s thought in the 
field of institutional economics. Section 3 deals with the meaning of institutional complementarity and how 
it can improve and extend the Coasian approach. Section 4 shows the essential role of historical analysis in 
the understanding the evolution and the diversity of actual institutions. Section 5 summarizes our main 
points, arguing that only a historical approach can fully develop the insights of the Coasian approach and 
offer a solution to its contradictions.   
  
 

1 Guido Calabresi (1991: 1211) noted:  
Some fifty-five years ago, in a seminal article called The Nature of the Firm, a young socialist named Ronald Coase sought to 
explain the existence of firms, of organizations within which markets were replaced by hierarchy and command. Twenty-five 
years later, in The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase, by then a middle-aged libertarian, indicated how markets could 
replace hierarchy and command structures to the perceived benefit of those who organized them. 
2. Costly institutions: the consistency of the Coasian contributions 
 
The substance and the purpose of institutions rest on reducing costs of transaction: “Markets are 
institutions that exist to facilitate exchange, that is, they exist in order to reduce the cost of carrying out 
exchange transactions” (Coase 1988a: 7). Subsequently, if the cost of performing the transactions in the 
market is higher than in firms, then firms “substitute” markets in that task.  
Within a firm […] market transactions are eliminated, and in place of the complicated market structure 
with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production. It is 
clear that these [i.e. market and firm] are alternative methods of co-ordinating production (Coase 1937: 
388, italics is added).  
And again, Coase maintains that “the operation of a market costs something and that, by forming an 
organization and allowing some authority (an “entrepreneur”) to direct the resources, certain marketing 
costs are saved” (Coase 1937: 392).  
Thus, the main argument delivered by Coase in “The Nature of the Firm” is that firms exist because there 
are costs of using the price mechanism and these costs can be reduced by the use of an administrative 
structure. The firm’s ability to substitute administrative fiat for bargaining may resolve concerns linked to 
dealing with transactions at a lower cost than in the market. In this respect, “The most important 
adaptation to the existence of transaction costs is the emergence of the firm” (Coase 1988a: 7). On the 
other hand, the administrative costs of firm organization may be very high, perhaps exceeding the costs of 
market organization. For this reason, 
a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become 
equal to the cost of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or 
the costs of organizing in another firm (Coase 1937: 395). 
Besides market and firm, a further institutional alternative for handling transactions and reducing 
transaction costs is governmental regulation. Coase (1960) maintained that the government could act as a 
“super-firm” through its ability to allocate resources by administrative fiat. In particular, the government 
may impose regulations through, for instance, administrative agencies – in its activity, the government, 
unlike the firm, also has the monopoly of coercion (by the police) at its disposal. However, nor is the 
government machine costless. There are governmental failures due, for instance, to incomplete information 
on benefits and costs, as well as producer or consumer preferences. Then, when the costs of governmental 
regulation are higher than market costs, the transaction should come back to the market – this was the 
main argument in regard to broadcasting frequencies put forward by Coase in his article “The Federal 
Communication Commission” – or carried out within the firm. 
Hence, whilst in the case of markets the movement (trans-action) of a resource from an agent Y to an agent 
X is carried out in a completely decentralized way by the price-mechanism, in the firm and in the State this 
movement or transaction is performed mainly by administrative decisions and hierarchical structures based 
on authority. Hence, Coase (1937, 1960) affirms, there are multiple (not obvious) options for dealing with 
transactions.2 And in regard to the Coasian approach, the economic investigation should explicate the 
functioning of these different modes of allocation and organization. 
Moreover, in 1960 Ronald Coase showed that the essential ingredient of efficient markets – as stated in the 
First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics – is the (definition and enforcement of) property 
rights: in the market, the trade of resources relies on alienable rights (that is, property rights) and consists 

2 However, one of the aforementioned institutional solutions should be chosen only if the net benefits which would result from 
the institutional rearrangement of activities is positive; otherwise, a last option is inertia, “to do nothing about the problem at all” 
(Coase 1960: 18).
of an exchange of rights on uses deriving from these resources. Like the Old-Institutionalists3 about ninety 
years ago (e.g. Commons 1924), Coase affirmed that markets require “the establishment of legal rules 
governing the rights and duties of those carrying out transactions in these facilities” (Coase 1988: 10) and 
the enforcement of these rules in order to secure the agreement of the parties to the exchange. This is the 
“legal Nirvana” which presupposes clear and enforced property rights, and it leads to the “economic 
Nirvana” in which the market wholly clears (Nicita and Pagano 2008). Furthermore, Coase (1960) 
demonstrates that there is no (analytical) difference between rights on piece of land and those allowing, for 
instance, the emission of  smoke. If rights are well defined, also the market transaction of rights to smoke 
could lead to Pareto efficiency. Hence, more precisely defined and easily tradable property rights may 
improve market exchanges and lead to a Pareto efficient allocation of resources, for every kind of 
economic resource.  
In the Coasian approach, an externality (i.e. the effect of one agent’s action on the welfare of another 
leading to the divergence between the private and social product of such an action) represents the absence 
of a market instead of the presence of a market failure. Externality has a reciprocal nature and consists 
essentially of interferences between rival uses of the resource, e.g. the Rancher’s use of the land to herd 
cattle vs. the Farmer’s use of it to grow crops. Externality problems are ultimately property rights problems 
and may be solved by defining property rights clearly and by facilitating the trade of resources. Each 
property right should specify the relevant attributes (including the enforcement) of each use of the resource 
and the contingencies that characterize such uses. Accordingly, externality problems do not constitute a 
prima facie case for public intervention (taxation or regulation) as affirmed by the Pigovian tradition – a 
policy insight that induced Coase to write, quite accidentally,4 “The Problem of Social Cost”.  
Assuming null transaction costs, once property rights have been defined, the parties will exchange them, 
maximizing the joint value of activities. This first thesis reappraises the statement of the First Fundamental 
Theorem of Welfare Economics, even if it underlines the fact that the Theorem is based and depends on 
well-defined property rights. Moreover, Coase demonstrates a further thesis: “the ultimate result (which 
maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to 
work without cost” (Coase 1960: 104). These two theses, the so-called efficiency and invariance thesis 
respectively, compose the Coase theorem.5  
In the absence of transaction costs, it does not matter what the law is, since people can always negotiate 
without cost to acquire, subdivide, and combine rights whenever this would increase the value of 
production. (Coase 1988a: 14).  
However, the world of zero transaction costs, to which the Coase theorem applies, and which Coase (1988: 
15) considers “the world of modern economic analysis”, is not the actual world. Above all, in such a world 

3 For a critical analysis of legal relations in the economic system along with the American Old-Institutional perspective, see 
Fiorito and Vatiero (2011) and Vatiero (2013) on this Journal.
4 Indeed, it is probable that “The Problem of Social Cost,” one of the most extensively cited articles in the whole of the modern 
economic literature, would never have been written if about twenty Chicagoan economists, such as Director, Friedman and 
Stigler, had not thought that Coase had made (what Stigler later referred to as) an “obvious mistake” and even “heresy” in his 
article of 1959 on “The Federal Communications Commission” (see Coase 1988, and also Medema 2009). 
5 As well known, Ronald Coase himself declined to use the label “Coase theorem”. The reformulation of Coase’s argument in 
the form of a theorem is attributed to George Stigler (Coase 1988a, 1988b) as follows: under perfect competition, private and 
social costs will be equal. Other formulations, before and shortly after Stigler’s are by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Demsetz 
(1967) and Calabresi (1968): for Buchanan and Tullock (1962: 47-48), “if the costs of organizing decisions should be zero, all 
externalities would be eliminated by voluntary private behaviour regardless of the initial structure of property rights”; Demsetz 
(1967: 349) asserts that “in a world of zero transaction costs […] the output mix that results when the exchange of property 
rights is allowed is efficient and the mix is independent of who is assigned ownership”; finally, for Calabresi (1968: 68), “if one 
assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully 
cured in the market by bargains”. Subsequently, the Coase theorem has been stated in numerous further ways (see Medema and 
Zerbe 1999), and also by Coase himself: “under null transaction costs, private and social costs will be equal” (Coase 1988b: 158).
institutions have no consistency, i.e. there are “firms without organization, and even exchange without 
markets” (Coase 1988a: 3); given that market, firms, and each institutional arrangement exist (at least in 
part) to reduce the transaction costs in the economic system, if we assume that these costs do not exist, 
then economic investigation does not require analysis of the actual market, actual firms and each actual 
institutional arrangement. On the contrary, the study of transaction costs requires study of the functioning 
of institutions.  
In 1981, Ronald Coase stated that  
while consideration of what would happen in a world of zero transaction costs can give us valuable 
insights, these insights are, in my view, without value except as steps on the way to the analysis of the 
real world of positive transaction costs. We do not do well to devote ourselves to a detailed study of the 
world of zero transaction costs, like augurs divining the future by the minute inspection of the entrails 
of a goose (Coase 1981: 187) 
Instead of inspecting a goose and imagining worlds with null transaction costs, Coase concluded his article 
“The Problem of Social Cost” by stating: 
We have the costs involved in operating the various social arrangements […] as well as the costs 
involved in moving to a new system. In devising and choosing among social arrangements we should 
have regard for the total effect. This, above all, is the change in approach which I am advocating (Coase 
1960: 44)  
Accordingly, when transaction costs are involved, economic agents generate economic institutions in order 
to minimize transaction costs and  
[t]he way in which industry is organized is thus dependent on the relation between the costs of carrying 
out transactions on the market and the costs of organizing the same operations within the firm [or 
other institutional arrangements] which can perform this task at the lowest cost (Coase 1972: 64)  
Paraphrasing Milton Friedman’s popular slogan There is no such thing as a free lunch, meaning that there is no 
socially relevant human need whose satisfaction is free, Coase shows that the issue of institutional 
substitution arises when none of the institutions is a “free lunch”. In this sense, Coase provided a 
fundamental starting point for the comparative analysis of institutions.  
However, the Coasian approach does not deal with two important issues stemming from the removal of 
free-lunch institutions. Costly lunches involve not only the substitution of the items on the menu but also 
their complementarities. One item on the menu may be (or not be) substituted by another if the 
complementary ingredients are present (or lacking). Moreover, if one ignores the historical set-up and its 
interlocking complementarities, one is forced to assume the existence of  costless meta-institutions where 
institutional substitution takes place. Some knowledge of history is required to understand the 
complementary institutional factors framing a particular institutional substitution choice. As in the title of 
Hodgson’s (2001) book, extending the analysis to costly institutions entails that economics cannot forget 
history.   
 
 
3. Beyond Coase: institutional complementarities. 
 
In his pivotal book Markets and Hierarchies, Oliver Williamson succinctly summarized the Transaction Cost 
Economics generated by Coase’s argument as follows:  
(1) Markets and firms are alternative instruments for competing a related set of transactions; (2) where a set of 
transactions ought to be executed across markets or within a firm depends on the relatively efficiency of each 
mode” (Williamson 1975: 8, italics is added).  
These two statements recapitulate the novelty of the Coasian view: namely that economic analysis should 
include the study of substitution among costly institutions; but they also indicate its limitations: the 
exclusion of institutional complementarities and history from economic analysis. Indeed, the fact that 
institutions are costly implies not only that institutional arrangements are substitutes intended to reduce 
transaction costs, but also that a certain degree of complementarity (or bundling) among institutions may be 
needed. 6  
When the “performance” of one institution is conditioned by and benefits from the presence of another 
institutions and vice-versa, we speak of institutional complementarity7; when, instead, the presence of one 
institution undermines the functioning of another, we speak of institutional crowding out.8 For instance, the 
more a market of production factors clears, the more efficiently a firm produces; the more efficiently a firm 
produces, the more tax-revenue the State may collect and use to provide better courts for the protection of 
rights; and the more property rights are protected, the more the market clears; and so on (see Vatiero 2009, 
ch. 4). Put briefly, private ownership, competitive markets and the rule of law often implement highly 
efficient solutions to allocation problems, but only if all three components are present (see Bowles 2004: 
12).  
The notion of institutional complementarity (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Pagano and Rowthorn 1994, 
Aoki 2001) relies on the idea that, in a given institutional framework, economic agents operate in different 
institutional domains. As a consequence, choices in one domain act as exogenous parameters in other 
domains and constitute the institutional environment in which institutional choices are made. According to 
Aoki (2001), institutional complementarities are situations of synchronic interdependence across distinct 
institutional domains. In this setting “one type of institution rather than another becomes viable in one 
domain, when a fitting institution is present in another domain and vice-versa” (Aoki 2001: 225).  
The term “fitting” used by Aoki invokes an evolutionary approach to institutional contexts. Accordingly, a 
growing body of literature shows that the evolution of economic systems may share some of the 
complicated intellectual challenges that characterize the Darwinian evolution of natural species in biology9 
(Hodgson 1993). As long as institutional complementarities are deep and strong, they can affect, or 
conceivably determine, the best-fitting institutional arrangements, and that system will differ depending on 
which local complement dominates.  
Analytically, suppose two institutional domains,  and , and with  and  as two “species” of each 
domain. Assuming a payoff function , let us suppose the following conditions: 

6 In some passages, also Coase seems to suggest the idea of complementarity/bundlimg among different institutional tools. For 
instance he argues that “for anything approaching perfect competition to exists, an intricate system of rules and regulations 
would be normally be needed […] regulation may play in widening the market” (Coase 1988a: 9), and that “the interrelationships 
which govern the mix of market and hierarchy […] are extremely complex” (Coase 1992: 718). These arguments imply that if the 
market is to achieve efficiency, it needs also complementary institutions such as hierarchical structures and governmental 
regulations.  
7 Complementarity is a recurrent and somewhat contentious topic of study for economic analysis. For instance, while Paul 
Samuelson in 1947 affirmed that “in my opinion, the problem of complementarity has received more attention than is merited 
by its intrinsic importance” (Samuelson 1947: 183), he later corrected himself in 1974, by asserting that “the time is ripe for a 
fresh, modern look at the concept of complementarity” (Samuelson 1974: 1255). On the notion of complementarity, see also 
Vatiero (2009). 
8 See Bowles (2004). One of the most frequently quoted examples of institutional crowding out is offered by Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000): the use of a market mechanism (the fine as a price) seems to have undermined  parents’ sense of obligation to 
avoid inconveniencing teachers by taking their children on time to school.
9 Coase believes that a more accurate depiction of human behavior can be found in biology, where human nature is seen as an 
outcome of a long-term evolutionary process in which genetic influences play an important role (Coase 1978: 244-245). 
However, Coase does nothing to develop these ideas.
                  [1] 
                  [2] 
Conditions [1] and [2] illustrate the situation in which the difference between the payoff from species  () 
and that from species  () increases if the institutional environment is of type  () rather than  (). 
Hence, the presence of species  () in one domain benefits and is benefited by the presence of the same 
species in the other domain. This expresses the idea of complementarity between two different domains. It 
can be proved that the two strategy profiles   and    may be Nash equilibrium profiles 
(Aoki 2001, see also Milgrom and Roberts 1990). When these two equilibria exist,  and  as well as  
and  are called ‘institutional complements’. Note that these two equilibria may be ranked in terms of 
efficiency: for instance, equilibrium   may be Pareto superior to   . Hence, institutional 
complementarities may engender, not a tendency towards systemic efficiency, but the emergence of 
different and (in)efficient economic equilibria. 
Moreover, the emergence of multiple equilibria, namely   and   , means that the 
convergence towards a certain Pareto-efficient equilibrium will be more complicated in both theory and 
practice than a simple smooth and expectable change. Indeed, institutional interdependences lead to 
patterns that Gunnar Myrdal and institutionalists such as William K. Kapp termed “circular and cumulative 
causation” and are now called “path-dependency”. Because of institutional complementarities, small 
changes may have durable consequences on “hybrid” situations, e.g. disequilibrium among institutional 
complements such as   and   . They may set off a circular and cumulative causation 
process leading rapidly to an equilibrium. On the other hand, big changes may not produce institutional or 
economic readjustments because of the costs of switching from one equilibrium to another; in this case the 
initial condition may have persistent “lock-in” effects10 – this is one of the (unfortunately implicit and 
untested) conditions of the so-called legal origins theory (e.g. La Porta et al. 1999).  
Institutional complementarity entails that economics, similarly to evolutionary biology, is a historical 
discipline. When institutions are costly, one should consider not only their possible substitutes but also 
how complementary institutions affect their costs and the costs of the possible institutional substitutes. 
Whereas in the Coasian approach optimal institutional substitution implies the existence and the 
convergence to a single optimal equilibrium, institutional complementarities entail that multiple (and 
possibly inefficient or non-comparable) equilibria can well exist.11  
 
 
4. The market as a meta-institution: difficulties of the Coasian approach. 
 
Also in this section a quotation from Oliver Williamson provides a useful starting point. In his book 
Markets and Hierarchies, Williamson writes: “I assume, for expositional convenience, that ‘in the beginning 

10 Biologists use the term punctuated equilibrium to refer to this alternating pattern of rapid stasis change (Eldredge and Gould 
1972). 
11 Multiple equilibria stemming from institutional complementarities can offer explanations for institutional arrangements in 
several contexts. For instance, they can aid understanding of why some markets work differently than others (e.g. Aoki 2001, 
Bowles 1998, Bowles and Gintis 1993), why some firms are organized differently from others (e.g. Aoki 2001, Pagano 2011, 
Pagano and Rowthorn 1994), why some societies are structured differently from others (e.g. Heinrich et al. 2001), and above all 
why different varieties of capitalism emerge and persist (Amable 2003, Belloc and Pagano 2013, Hall and Gingerich 2009, Hall 
and Soskice 2001, Roe 2003).  

there was the market’” (Williamson 1975: 20). As this statement shows, a recurrent condition of transaction 
costs economics is that the market, like a product of Immaculate Conception (Dugger 1992: 89), is assumed to 
pre-exist other institutional substitutes (see also Hodgson 1988: 177-182). This assumption that in the 
beginning there was the market limits the analysis of the consequences of costly institutions and involves the 
puzzling idea that costless meta-markets are available to select other institutions, including ordinary 
markets. (Meta)-markets assume the contradictory status of being both among the costly institutions to be 
selected and the only costless institutions by which all the institutions are selected. The assumption that in 
the beginning there was the market means losing large part of the analysis stemming from Coase’s insight of 
costly markets and, in general, of non-free-lunch institutions. 
These limitations are particularly evident in the case of institutional rearrangements deriving from 
technological shocks. In 1937 Coase maintained that technological innovation can change the institutional 
context; “[c]hanges like the telephone and the telegraph, which tend to reduce the cost of organising 
spatially, will tend to increase the size of the firm” (Coase 1937: 397). The idea is that “[i]nventions which 
tend to bring factors of production nearer together, by lessening spatial distribution”, that is, by exploiting 
economies of scale, “tend to increase the size of the firm” (Coase 1937: 397). Furthermore, in a footnote 
he also underlined that:  
It should be noted that most inventions will change both the cost of organising and the costs of using 
the price system. In such cases, whether the invention tends to make firms large or smaller will depend 
on the relative effect of these two sets of costs. For instance, if the telephone reduces the costs of using 
the price mechanism more than it reduces the costs of organising, then it will have the effect of 
reducing the size of the firm (Coase 1937: 397, ft. 3).  
In other words, the optimal institutional bundle, consisting of features from different institutions, is 
recalculated and implemented each time that the technological data change.12 However, such an institutional 
rearrangement seems to be cost-free, as if some costless meta-markets take care of the transition from 
markets and firms (and vice-versa). The transition from a market price-mechanism to a hierarchy such as the 
firm, due to the development of new technologies, occurs without significant costs. Thus, Coasian markets 
seem to have a double role in the reaction to technological innovations,: on the one hand, they represent 
one of the possible costly institutional substitutes; on the other, they serve as a cost-free meta-institution 
within which the other institutions are efficiently substituted. The functioning costs of markets limit the 
size of markets and explain the emergence of firms. At the same time, (meta-)markets justify the emergence 
of an efficient mix of markets and firms. Their functioning costs do not affect the achievement of an 
efficient institutional bundle, and they do not constrain the transition, required by technological change, 
from one organization to the other.  
If we take serious account of Coase’s intuition that neither markets nor firms can be first best solutions (in 
the sense that they are both constrained by their own costs of functioning), then the transition from 
market-type to firm-type organization (and vice-versa) must also be grounded on the analysis of transaction 
costs.  Costly institutions have to be substituted in a costly institutional context. The existence of 
transaction costs implies the existence of transition costs: in a world of positive transaction costs, 
transition, or institutional switching, costs must also be positive. With significant transition costs, the 
institutional bundle may not simply tend to optimally correspond to the level of technological 
development, but must be heavily influenced by the pre-existing institutional structure of the economy. In 
other words, high costs of transition may inhibit or reduce potential (efficient) institutional rearrangements 
even in the presence of significant technological shocks. For this reason, the assumption that in the beginning 
there was the market neglects the fact that the substitution of institutions may not occur because of transition 

12 However, the reverse causation may also hold: the institutional bundle may affect the choice of technology (see Braverman 
1974, Pagano and Rowthorn 1994). 
costs. It fails to understand that each transition occurs in a pre-existing institutional context, which is often 
characterized by numerous interlocking complementarities.  
If one wants to avoid the “Nirvana fallacy” of a zero transaction world, one has to specify the relations of 
the initial institutional set-up and the costs of the potential institutional changes. In other words, one must 
move towards a history-dependent economics. A consistent Coasian approach must necessarily lead to 
some form of “evolutionary” economics where the initial institutional features are necessarily relevant to 
the explanation and the prediction of the final outcomes. Unfortunately, Coase did not consider these 
logical consequences of his analysis and failed to consider economics as a historical discipline. 
A historical perspective should start from the fact that costly institutions (including the market), where costly 
resources are allocated, must evolve in a costly manner. Institutional substitution is not determined in a 
meta-market Nirvana but it occurs within a pre-existing institutional bundle constraining the set and the 
costs of institutional substitution. New technologies such as the telephone (analysed by Coase in his 1937 
article) cannot be the only factors determining the future institutional bundle. Each transition (as well as 
each stasis of an economic system) is always influenced also by the past mix of institutions and by their 
interlocking complementarities. As a result, the development of markets and of other institutions is a 
historical outcome influenced by other complementary domains such as the legal context and politics. A 
further consequence is that “institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient, 
rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power 
to devise new rules” (North 1990:16)13.  
Linking institutions and institutional change only to economic performance and technological changes sets 
serious limitations on economic analysis. One should analyse institutions with respect to the establishment 
and evolution of social and political compromises. Institutional change is often the outcome of strategies 
aimed at improving the situation of some or all components of the dominant elite. Mancur Olson’s early 
contribution The Rise and the Decline of Nations and Daron Acemoglu’s recent book (with J.A. Robinson) Why 
Nations Fail consider numerous historical examples of how the logic of groups’ collective behavior may 
favour or damage the growth of nations by changing the institutions of society. The main result of this 
stream of literature is that historical specificity matters because “past institutional choices open up some paths 
and foreclose others for future institutional development” (Ostrom, 1990: 202). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Using “the beautiful simple prose of the accomplished English essayist” (Posner 1993: 205)14, Coase 
demonstrated how mainstream economics was based on a contradictory amalgam of costly physical inputs 
and free institutional resources. Ronald Coase removed the assumption of free institutions and extended 
the logic of “efficient” substitution to costly economic institutions.  
According to Robbins’s classical definition, economics is the science of human choice, i.e. substitution 
among amounts of consumer goods and production factors. In many respects, Coase’s contribution was a 
logical extension of this choices/substitution approach to institutional contexts: if all institutions (including 
the market) are costly, we have a higher order substitution problem regarding the institutions within which 

13 Similarly, Amable (2003) defines institutions as political economy equilibria in the sense that they correspond to a compromise 
between conflicting social actors. Institutions derive from past and present struggles between factions with diverging interests. 
14 According to Oliver Williamson (1989: 229), Coase’s reluctance to formalize his argumentation slowed his influence, in 
particular in the case of the theory (on the nature) of the firm.
physical resources are substituted. Also institutions are costly alternative modes of allocation of costly 
resources.  
In doing so, on the one hand, while advocating a comparative analysis of institutions, Coase considered 
them only as substitutes and ignored their complementarities. On the other hand, Coase was faced with a 
related problem of logical infinite regress: also the costly institutions have to be substituted in a costly 
institutional context.  
Coase truncated, or better ignored, these problems by implicitly assuming the existence of costless meta-
markets – an assumption that, unfortunately, has become the explicit assumption of much of the 
subsequent transaction cost analysis and is well captured by the already cited statement that “in the beginning 
there was the market” (Williamson 1975: 20). In this article, we have argued that there is only one way out of 
the sterile logical regress involving the Nirvana fallacy of (meta…)-meta-institutions: accepting that 
economics is a historical science and that each institutional substitution has be examined within a certain 
historical context characterized by numerous institutional complementarities.   
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